Across shipyards and testing ranges from Shanghai to Hainan, China’s navy is moving at a pace that has drawn close attention from capitals and analysts around the world. In 2025 a string of developments crystallized into a clear pattern: the People’s Liberation Army Navy is investing heavily in carrier capability, underwater drones, long range strike systems and the domestic industrial base needed to sustain them. Taken together, these moves are reshaping the balance of power in the western Pacific and forcing political leaders to rethink planning, deterrence and the logistics of operating at sea.
At the center of the headlines is the Fujian, China’s newest indigenously designed carrier. The ship has progressed from sea trials to more advanced catapult launch tests that demonstrate the vessel can support a modern air wing with faster, heavier and more capable aircraft. Footage and official releases in 2025 showed new carrier-capable planes launching by electromagnetic catapult, a capability that brings China closer to the sort of operational flexibility seen on Western carriers. That matters because catapult systems expand the types of aircraft a carrier can operate, from heavier early warning planes to future stealth fighters, changing how a carrier can project power far from home waters.
The carrier story is only part of China’s maritime strategy. In parallel, Beijing is investing in uncrewed undersea systems that promise new ways to sense, surveil and if necessary act below the waves. Recent reporting described movement of very large uncrewed submarines to testing areas in the South China Sea. These systems are not simply scaled down submarines. They are being designed to operate for long durations, carry sensors and payloads, and operate alongside crewed vessels in layered task groups. If they reach operational maturity, uncrewed undersea vehicles could dramatically extend situational awareness in contested waters and complicate the calculus of any opposing navy.
Meanwhile, China’s missile tests and weapons demonstrations are part of a complementary push to deny adversaries easy access to key maritime approaches. In the last weeks analysts and open sources reported tests of advanced hypersonic or maneuvering weapons, systems that are designed to challenge existing missile defenses and to threaten high value targets at long range. Whether described as variants of existing medium to long range systems or as newer hypersonic designs, the effect is the same. Beijing is expanding the tools it can use to threaten ships and bases at sea, creating a broader zone where conventional freedom of action may be contested.
This multifaceted approach is supported by an industrial surge. Chinese shipbuilding capacity has increased significantly over the last decade, and the submarine fleet is growing in both size and sophistication. Official and open source estimates point to an expanding undersea force that will include more quiet nuclear attack submarines and additional classes of ballistic missile submarines in the years ahead. That buildout changes strategic math not only for regional navies but for global powers that operate periodically in the western Pacific. A larger submarine fleet gives China more options to patrol choke points, to shadow other ships, or to shape adversary behavior in peacetime and crisis alike.
Policy choices in Beijing underline that this is not just hardware. Analysts note closer cooperation between China and Russia on military training and certain kinds of hardware transfers. Recent reporting suggests expanded training and equipment exchanges that would help China build airborne assault capabilities and refine operational concepts. For regional planners, the implication is clear. If China and partners are practicing complex joint operations that include airborne insertion, naval amphibious elements and long range strike, then contingency planning in Washington, Tokyo, Canberra and other capitals must account for those combined capabilities.
Taken together, these developments point to a maritime strategy that emphasizes layered denial, survivability and the ability to operate under contested conditions. Carriers extend the reach of air power at sea, submarines and uncrewed undersea vehicles complicate adversary anti-submarine efforts, and long range strike systems raise the risk profile for fleets operating close to contested littoral zones. That combination is particularly consequential in seas where geography narrows options for maritime maneuver, such as around Taiwan and in the South China Sea.
How should other nations respond? For many, the answer is not only more hardware but smarter posture and logistics. Exercises that improve anti-submarine warfare, partnerships that keep sea lanes open, and investments in distributed platforms all make sense in a world where peer navies are more capable. The presence of larger and quieter submarines increases the need for persistent sensors and for coordinated information sharing among allies. Similarly, the emergence of uncrewed undersea systems argues for new rules and protocols on detection, classification and deconfliction at sea. Without them, incidents and misunderstandings become more likely.
There are also hard operational tradeoffs for China. Building carriers and catapult systems is expensive and complex. Ships that project power require logistics, maintenance facilities and trained aircrews. The effort to field advanced uncrewed systems demands sensors, secure communications and robust command arrangements. Sustaining these forces at operational readiness places long term demands on budgets, supply chains and technical talent. Beijing is investing heavily, but the expense is real and it shapes the choices available to Chinese planners.
Another complicating factor is the technological bottleneck in advanced semiconductors. Cutting edge weapons and sensors rely on chips that remain subject to export controls and global supply chain pressure. That reality has pushed China to accelerate domestic chip development and to design around constraints, but the short to medium term effect is clear. Some high end capabilities will require workarounds or slower progress until domestic suppliers can match the performance of global leaders. This constraint is a strategic pressure point for all sides.
Public messaging and signaling accompany these programs as well. State releases and visual footage of carrier launch tests or missile shots serve multiple purposes: they reassure domestic audiences, deter potential adversaries, and shape diplomatic conversations. The very visibility of new capabilities alters risk perceptions across the region. Diplomats now find themselves balancing routine commercial ties with the reality of growing military competition nearby. That dynamic makes crisis management more important and more complicated at the same time.
What does this mean for the security of the Indo Pacific over the next decade? The prognosis is not uniform. If China successfully fields a balanced mix of carriers, manned and uncrewed undersea systems and credible long range strike options, the regional force posture will become more contested and costly to sustain for outside navies. Conversely, if industrial, logistical or technological hurdles slow progress, then the transition will be uneven, giving room for diplomacy, arms control initiatives and cooperative mechanisms to shape outcomes. Either way, the present trajectory demands attention from planners and publics alike.
For civilians and businesses that depend on maritime commerce, the implications are practical. More capable regional navies raise the stakes for freedom of navigation, insurance costs for certain routes and the political risk of port calls. Governments and private firms will watch the development of undersea sensors, convoy procedures and allied naval drills because disruptions to shipping could ripple through global supply chains. Preparing for those contingencies is part of the new normal.
Ultimately, China’s naval push is more than a parade of new platforms. It is an expression of strategic intent to secure maritime interests, develop an independent technological base and prepare for a range of contingencies. The arrival of catapult-capable carriers, very large uncrewed submarines and advanced strike systems does not by itself make conflict inevitable. What it does do is change the terms on which maritime competition and cooperation will occur in the years ahead. For policymakers, the choice now is to combine deterrence with dialogue, to shore up alliances and to invest in the sensors, logistics and norms that help keep seas open and predictable even when competition intensifies.
Photo Credit: Peng LIU / Unsplash
